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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000135

SIPDIS

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BAGHDAD PLEASE PASS TO MNF-I AND PRT MOSUL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2017
TAGS: [PREL](#) [MOPS](#) [PGOV](#) [TU](#) [IZ](#) [US](#)
SUBJECT: TURKEY REQUESTS CONTINGENCY SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
FOR ITS NEW MOSUL CONSULATE

REF: 06 ANKARA 6082 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: POL/C Janice G. Weiner for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

11. (U) This is an action request -- please see para. 8.

12. (C) Summary: The Turkish Consul General to Mosul, H. Avni Botsali, plans to deploy permanently in early February. Botsali told us that -- despite some tense moments -- he has a good relationship with Ninewah Governor Kashmoula, though less so with Kashmoula's deputy. Botsali confirmed that his first line of defense in case of a crisis (such as an attack on the consulate or its personnel) will be the Iraqi authorities, but asked that local commanders at FOB Marez be authorized to offer assistance in extremis. End summary.

13. (C) On Jan. 11 and 23, we met with Turkey's Consul General to Mosul, H. Avni Botsali. Botsali hopes to deploy permanently to Mosul the first week of February. He reported that construction was going smoothly, and showed us photos of the site. He repeated his intention to engage all communities in his consular district (which will include Ninewah province and the KRG, but not -- for now -- Kirkuk): "We will not just be talking to Turkomans," he asserted. Botsali expressed appreciation for PRT Mosul and the 25th ID's assistance with his previous visits to Mosul (most recently Dec. 29), and looks forward to working with our people there.

14. (C) Botsali reported that Governor Kashmoula has been helpful during his visits and is appreciative that Turkey is opening a consulate there. The Governor has provided security for Botsali and his people, offered gracious hospitality, and has been receptive to Turkey's offers of assistance to train medical personnel and for water projects. However, Botsali reported that during their Dec. 29 meeting, Kashmoula confronted Botsali on the PKK issue, specifically (according to Botsali) claiming that there were no terrorist elements in Makhmour refugee camp and insisting that Turkey cease pressuring the GOI and KRG on the PKK issue. Botsali said that on a previous visit he and Kashmoula had had a tense exchange on Turkish petroleum shipments into Iraq. Nevertheless, Botsali emphasized, he has a positive

relationship with the Governor and his people, though less so with the Deputy Governor, Khesro Goran, a KDP official. He recounted that Goran invited the press to a luncheon for Botsali, and Goran proceeded to tell the press -- in Kurdish, which was not interpreted for Botsali -- that Turkey fully supports the Iraqi Kurdish program, including on Kirkuk.

¶15. (C) Botsali emphasized that his first outreach in an emergency (for example, an attack on the consulate or its personnel, especially resulting in casualties or the need to evacuate) would be to Iraqi officials. He has, for example, installed a direct line from the consulate to Mosul's main hospital. However, Botsali went on, there have been occasions when he has been unable to raise the Governor or his security director, despite having been given many land-line and cell phone numbers.

¶16. (C) In such an eventuality, or if the Iraqis are unable or unwilling to help, Botsali may need to reach out urgently to FOB Marez. He is concerned that U.S. commanders there may be compelled to seek authority from Baghdad or even Washington/Tampa before rendering assistance, losing valuable time in a crisis. Thus he requested that our personnel at FOB Marez be authorized to take a local decision in case the Turkish consulate requests assistance in an emergency.

¶17. (C) We emphasized that Botsali's first line of defense should be the Iraqis, and that the list of scenarios may be difficult to encompass in any agreement. Some assistance might be comparatively easy to provide, such as allowing access to FOB Marez to medevac wounded personnel. Other assistance might be more difficult, like extracting Turks

ANKARA 00000135 002 OF 002

from an ongoing terrorist attack. Additionally, we suggested, it might make more sense for Botsali to work this out with PRT Mosul when he actually commences operations in February. Botsali responded that he was not/not seeking an agreement in writing, but simply USG assurance that we would not leave him or his people waiting for a decision during a crisis.

¶18. (U) Action Request: We seek Embassy Baghdad, MNF-I, and PRT Mosul's guidance on this matter.

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